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2.1  Introduction 
The rise of regionalism continues to pose challenges for specialists in inter- 
national trade. One classic question is the aggregate welfare effects of regional 
trade liberalization. Another is the political economy of regionalism: how lib- 
eralization on a regional basis affects the welfare of nations and domestic inter- 
est groups, and how their self-interested actions shape the global trading sys- 
tem. A  third  question,  with  which we  are concerned  in this  paper,  is how 
important regional arrangements actually have been for the pattern of trade. 
The gravity model of international trade has been the workhorse for empiri- 
cal studies of this question to the virtual exclusion of other approaches.' Trade 
between two countries is posited to increase with their size (as proxied by their 
GDPs and populations) and to decline with transactions costs (proxied by the 
geographic distance between them and by whether or not they share a common 
border). While there is no close correspondence between the leading theoreti- 
cal models of trade and the variables appearing in the gravity equation, a num- 
ber of authors have suggested that the gravity-model framework is compatible 
both with the Heckscher-Ohlin model and with theories of  trade in the pres- 
ence of imperfect competition.* The attraction of  the gravity model (no pun 
intended) is not simply lack of theoretical incompatibility, of course, but its 
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ability to explain the variation in bilateral trade flows across a wide variety of 
countries and periods. Few aggregate economic relationships are as robust. 
To  analyze the cffects of  regionalism, investigators  typically  add dummy 
variables  for participation  in  regional  arrangements  (Hamilton  and Winters 
1992; Frankel and Wei  1993).  A positive coefficient  on the dummy variable 
indicating that two countries, both of which participate in the same preferential 
arrangement, trade more with  one another than predicted by  their incomes, 
population, and distance is interpreted as suggesting that the arrangement is 
trade-creating for its members. A negative coefficient on a second dummy vari- 
able indicating when only one member of the pair participates in a particular 
preferential arrangement is taken as evidence of trade diversion vis-8-vis the 
rest of the world. 
Empirically, dummy variables for regional  arrangements sometimes show 
up as having substantial trade-creating effects. Two countries both of  which 
are members of one of these regional groupings trade more with one another 
than would be predicted by their observable economic characteristics (GDP, 
population, distance from one another) and the average behavior of countries 
in the sample. Alarmingly, however, they often trade significantly more with 
one another than otherwise predicted even before the regional arrangement in 
question came into effect.? One can argue that this reflects the impact on trade 
of the anticipated implementation of a regional liberalization agreement: sup- 
pliers begin to reorient their exports in anticipation of future market opening. 
In  addition, regional arrangements are often preceded by other arrangements 
that are less formal and less comprehensive in commodity coverage but that 
include many of the same countries: the European Economic Community was 
preceded by the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Pay- 
ments Union was preceded by the First Agreement on Multilateral Monetary 
Compensation and the Agreement for Intra-European Payments and Compen- 
sations, for example. But the fact that dummy variables for membership in a 
regional grouping can indicate substantial effects long before the preferential 
arrangement in question and even its predecessors came into operation, plus 
the fact that there is little sign of increases in the magnitude of the bloc vari- 
able when negotiations quicken or a successful conclusion is reached, gives 
grounds for skepticism that it is merely expectational effects at work. 
Another interpretation of the persistent significance of bloc variables is that 
members  of  a regional  trade  arrangement  differ  systematically  from  other 
countries in ways that promote unusually high levels of intrabloc trade. Mea- 
sures of  bloc membership  are thus contaminated  by  omitted-variables bias. 
One response to this problem has been to develop measures of  the relevant 
omitted factors. Frankel  and Wei (1993) take a step in this direction, adding 
common language in an effort to pick up cultural and political factors that may 
reduce transactions costs and encourage bilateral trade. 
3. This appears to be the case, for example, in several of thc interwar trade and payments a- 
rangerncnts considered in Eichengreen and Irwin (1995). 35  The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows 
Another response, as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), is to estimate the 
gravity equation in first-difference form, which causes determinants of bilat- 
eral trade flows that are constant over time, including unobservable characteris- 
tics of countries affecting their propensity to trade, to drop out of the specifi- 
cation.  Of  course, this  does  not  correct for omitted-variables  bias  caused 
by determinants of  trade that vary with time. Nor is this procedure suited for 
samples in which membership in regional arrangements does not change, since 
the bloc variables will drop out of the differenced spe~ification.~ 
In this paper we take another step by  analyzing the impact of history on 
trade. The idea that past trade  patterns  influence current trade flows is in- 
tuitively plausible.  Countries with  a history  of trading with  one another- 
whether for reasons related to politics, policies, or other factors-generally 
continue doing so. Producers, having set up market-specific sales, distribution, 
and service networks that allow them to generate a level of exports greater than 
would be predicted by  the scale and geographical distance of the destination 
market, should continue to generate a disproportionate  level of exports over 
time. Thus, passing historical events that allow costs to be sunk can be associ- 
ated with persistent increases in the level of trade. The events in question can 
be anything from a history of colonialism (in which case military means were 
used to install the infrastructure needed to support bilateral trade) to a history 
of migration (one thinks of Japanese migration to Brazil and Peru, which pro- 
vides Latin America with linguistic and cultural capital that supports extensive 
trade with Japan) to purely chance events. 
The recent theoretical and empirical literature suggests a number of other 
explanations for hysteresis in trade (the possibility that trade does not return to 
its previous value after a temporary    hock).^ The existence of  economies of 
scale and scope in the production of  goods and services can cause trade to flow 
in particular geographical channels for historical reasons; thus, a large share 
of South African exports has long been destined for Britain because economies 
of scale implied the existence of only one international gold market, which for 
historical reasons was located in London. A temporary tariff or exchange rate 
fluctuation that causes foreign firms to establish branch plants in overseas mar- 
kets-one  thinks of “transplant” production by Japanese automotive firms- 
may continue to influence trade in intermediate and final goods long after the 
disturbance is past. Current consumption may be influenced by the history of 
trade: manufacturers who use steel as an input may shun foreign supplies be- 
cause they lack familiarity with its quality; a steel strike that interrupts domes- 
tic supplies, as happened in the United States in the  1960s and  1970s, may 
leave them no alternative to imports. As a result, they acquire familiarity with 
reliable foreign suppliers and consume a permanently higher share of imported 
4. Thus, the specification of Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1993), who hold the composition of their 
European Community bloc constant over time, is not suited to this approach. 
5. Hysteresis, strictly speaking, refers to the case where a passing shock to trade has permanent 
effects. For our purposes, all that is necessary is that a passing shock has effects with significant 
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steel even after the temporary interruption to domestic supplies has passed. 
Readers will be quick to think of other examples. 
The common implication of these stories is that current trade flows should 
be a positive function of past trade flows even after controlling for the determi- 
nants of bilateral trade included in the gravity model. Insofar as other variables 
included in the gravity equation are correlated with past trade flows, omitting 
lagged trade will bias their estimated effects. In particular, there is reason to 
suspect that preferential trade arrangements are positively correlated with past 
trade flows. Some countries  seek to insulate their important trade relations 
from shocks to the global trade regime by  using preferential  trade  arrange- 
ments as safeguards.h Insofar as the creation of the preferential arrangements 
was itself a response to the unusual importance historically of intrabloc trade, 
gravity equations omitting lagged trade may overstate the effects of bloc mem- 
bership. 
This is not to suggest that such effects should be equally powerful  in all 
times and places. The influence of past trade over current trade may vary with 
circumstances; a war, a depression, trade conflict, or an unusually successful 
global trade negotiation may disrupt established trade relations in ways that lift 
the heavy hand of history. Similarly, the correlation between past trade flows 
and regional  arrangements will  tend  to vary with circumstances;  the recent 
literature points to a number of reasons why countries have been attracted to 
the regional approach to liberalization in recent years. The importance of the 
factors on which we focus in this paper is ultimately an empirical question. 
In practice, isolating the impact of lagged trade on current trade presents not 
inconsequential estimation problems. As in Griliches's classic article (1961), it 
may be difficult to distinguish the effects of lagged dependent variables from 
those of autocorrelated residuals. Although we estimate the model using cross- 
section rather than time-series data, a standard time-series result carries over: 
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates of the effects of  lagged trade on cur- 
rent trade flows may be biased in the presence of autocorrelated errors. We 
employ  a variety  of  econometric  techniques  to address this problem,  all of 
which fortunately tend to yield similar results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the theoret- 
ical literature on hysteresis in trade, emphasizing contributions with potential 
relevance  for the gravity  model,  and  recounts  some historical episodes  de- 
signed to illustrate the applicability of those models. In section 2.3 we present 
an empirical analysis of historical factors in bilateral trade. Adding historical 
factors turns out to have important implications for the effects we ascribe to 
regional arrangements; we draw these out 'in the conclusion. 
6.  One motivation for the development of the British system of Commonwealth preferences, for 
example, was that the unusually extensive network of intra-Commonwealth trade that had devel- 
oped over the years, as a result of British migration to the overseas regions of recent European 
settlement and the special protection afforded British investment in its overseas dependencies, was 
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2.2  Theoretical Literature and Historical Illustrations 
Traditional trade theory provides little guidance on the question of how past 
trade patterns should affect current trade flows. Typically, current trade is re- 
lated to current factor endowments and current technologies. There is no rea- 
son in these models why earlier factor endowments and technologies, much 
less earlier trade flows, should influence current trade patterns independent of 
current factor endowments and current technologies. 
In contrast, new theories of trade in the presence of monopolistic competi- 
tion suggest that initial conditions can influence trade flows in ways that intro- 
duce a role for history. These theories were developed to analyze, among other 
things, the possibility of  hysteresis in trade. Baldwin (1988), Dixit (1989), 
Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and others focused on how a large but tempo- 
rary real exchange rate shock could have permanent effects on the pattern of 
trade. These effects hinge on sunk costs of market entry and exit for domestic 
and foreign firms. Sunk costs are associated with the need to set up distribution 
and sales networks in the foreign markets prior to initiating export sales. A 
temporary appreciation of a country’s currency can make the entry of foreign 
firms profitable, leading them to undertake a one-time investment in distribu- 
tion capacity in the domestic market. Even if the currency depreciates back to 
its initial level, they have no incentive to exit, the up-front costs of distribution 
and marketing having been sunk. Thus, a temporary exchange rate shock can 
alter the structural relationship between imports and the exchange rate, perma- 
nently affecting the pattern of trade. 
Although in this example exchange rate movements are the temporary shock 
permanently altering the pattern of trade, any number of factors can have such 
effects. Any temporary disruption to current trade patterns-due  to war, de- 
pression, or temporary tariffs, for example-could  provide an incentive for 
exporters to sink the fixed costs of penetrating foreign markets. 
There is some empirical evidence consistent with these models. Bean (1988) 
finds evidence from the United Kingdom’s trade in the 1980s which suggests 
structural change in the United Kingdom’s export and import patterns as a re- 
sult of  the appreciation of  sterling in the early  1980s. Roberts and Tybout 
(1999, using firm-level data from Colombia, examine the role of fixed costs 
in determining whether a firm exports or not. They find that previous export 
experience has a substantial effect on the probability of  exporting, rejecting 
the view that sunk costs are unimportant. 
Historical examples may  also be useful for illustrating that these mecha- 
nisms can actually operate in practice. The point is not to demonstrate hystere- 
sis in trade-that  one-time changes in the direction of trade have permanent 
effects-since  this  is  not  necessary  for  our  argument, only  to  show  that 
changes in trade flows can have effects with significant persistence. 
For simplicity, it may  help to start with the case of  a particular firm.  An 
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of the temporary preferences extended by Australia to British sewing machines 
in 1907. While imports from other countries paid 10 percent duties, for a pe- 
riod of only a few months machines of British manufacture were admitted free. 
In response, Singer transferred its Australian business from its American to its 
British branch. British sewing-machine exports rose, while their U.S. counter- 
parts fell. Importantly for our purposes, Singer’s British branch having estab- 
lished the relevant contacts with Australian retailers, the source of exports to 
Australia did not shift back following the removal of the tariff not long thereaf- 
ter. Britain, not the United States, remained the dominant source of Singer’s 
exports to Australia (Saul 1960, 218-19).  Thus, a one-time rise in British ex- 
ports of sewing machines due to a purely transitory shock resulted in a persis- 
tent rise in British sales to Australia of the product. 
It is not obvious, of course, that the effects of changes in the level of trade 
have comparable effects in the aggregate. Two sources of variation in the ag- 
gregate data capable of  shedding light on this question are wars and depres- 
sions. Consider the effects of World War I on trade in the 1920s. The war was 
a severe disruption to the pattern of multilateral settlements inherited from the 
nineteenth century. Insofar as hostilities were concentrated in Europe, its most 
powerful impact was on intra-European trade and on the trade of  European 
nations with other parts of the world. Because of the sudden shortage of ship- 
ping and the diversion of capacity to domestic military uses, the war disrupted 
exports from Britain to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Allies discour- 
aged Latin American countries from exporting raw materials to Germany and 
maintained a blacklist of firms in Latin America that they believed to be under 
the control of German nationals. As a result, Latin American customers accus- 
tomed to purchasing manufactures from British and German sources suddenly 
found themselves starved of merchandise. U.S. manufacturers, in contrast, saw 
an opportunity in the Latin American market vacated by the British and Ger- 
mans. They set up marketing, distribution, and after-sales service networks; 
having sunk the costs of  entry during the war,  they proved hard to dislodge 
after 1918.’As table 2.1 illustrates, the United Kingdom’s share of the imports 
of every Latin American country fell between 1913 and 1928, while the share 
of  the United States rose for every country but the Guianas. This change oc- 
curred despite the absence of significant changes in the relative tariff treatment 
of Latin American imports from the two sources. 
World War I disruptions similarly provided Japan the opportunity to pene- 
trate Asian markets long dominated by European producers. Japan constructed 
paper mills and factories for the manufacture of drugs, paints, and other prod- 
ucts for sale in India and in other Asian markets temporarily vacated by the 
British. Its textile industry penetrated the Australian market for the first time. 
The cost of factory construction and distribution having been sunk, the Japa- 
7.  Moreover, wartime shipbuilding increased the export capacity of the United States and per- 
mitted U.S. goods to be transported more cheaply in the 1920s. Additional details beyond those 
presented here can be found in Kaufman (1974). 39  The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows 
Table 2.1  South American Imports from the United States and United 
Kingdom, 1913 and 1928 (percentage share) 
19  13 Imports  1928 Imports 












































































Source: Mitchell 1993,418-93. 
nese did not withdraw from these new markets when British exports came on 
stream again in the 1920s. In the aggregate, then, the wartime change in the 
volume of  exports from Britain and the United States to Latin America and 
from Britain and Japan to southern Asia had persistent effects throughout the 
1920s. 
A further example is the impact of the breakdown of the pattern of multilat- 
eral settlements in the 1930s on the post-World  War I1 direction of trade.8  The 
destruction of multilateral trade in the 1930s is too well known to be rehearsed 
here. Tariffs and nontariff barriers were applied to restrict trade to a series 
of  relatively self-contained trade blocs. Germany in particular used bilateral 
clearing arrangements and exchange controls to limit its trade to Central and 
Eastern European countries in its sphere of influence. But the phenomenon was 
general: as tariffs were raised, countries extended preferences to their overseas 
territories and to countries associated with them in a monetary area. Thus the 
share of the exports of Western Europe (including Britain) that flowed to the 
overseas sterling area rose from 26.8 percent in 1928 to 28.5 percent in 1938, 
whereas the share of Western European imports drawn from this area rose from 
22.1 to 25.0 percent. Meanwhile, the share of Western European imports drawn 
from the overseas territories of the continental European countries rose from 
4.9 to 8.7 percent (Dewhurst et al. 1961, 655). Increasingly, direct foreign in- 
vestment flowed through these same channels, with new British factories set 
up in the sterling area importing capital equipment and suitable raw materials 
from British sources, and new factories set up by continental European coun- 
tries in their overseas dependencies doing likewise (Dewhurst et al. 1961,658). 
8. Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) provides references to the literature in which this phenomenon 
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Thus, the share of Britain’s and continental Europe’s trade conducted with the 
sterling  area and the overseas territories, respectively, remained  high  in the 
wake of World War 11. This would appear to be another instance where changes 
in the pattern  of trade in the 1930s, by leading producers to sink fixed costs, 
had effects on the pattern of trade that were still evident decades later, 
It is important to note that this last example admits to an alternative interpre- 
tation. Intra-sterling  area trade and trade between continental Europe and its 
colonies could have remained high not because of the impact of sunk costs on 
trade but because the changes in commercial policy that brought about this 
shift in the 1930s were not fully reversed in the 1950s.  While European coun- 
tries rolled back their tariffs in early General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) rounds (Geneva in 1947,  Annecy in 1949,  Torquay in 1950-Sl), many 
countries in Latin America and Asia were not yet GATT members and did not 
participate. Thus relatively high tariffs held over from the  1930s could have 
been responsible for the diversion of trade into imperial channels. Moreover, 
Britain, when imposing its general tariff in 1932, at the same time extended 
preferential treatment to its empire; because tariffs were rolled back incom- 
pletely  in the  1950s, imperial preferences  remained. It could have been the 
persistence of these changes in commercial policy, rather than persistence in 
trade itself, in other words, that explains this link from the 1930s to the 1950s. 
Ultimately, the relative importance of lagged trade and current commercial 
policy in explaining the pattern of trade is an empirical question, to which we 
now turn. 
2.3  Empirical Analysis 
2.3.1  Data and Estimation 
The typical gravity-model  specification relates  bilateral trade  to income, 
population (or per capita income, as here), contiguity, and distance between 
the trading partners. Thus the value of bilateral trade between countries i and j 
in a given year is considered to be a (natural) log-linear function of the inde- 
pendent variables as in the following expression: 
P” + PI  In (YY,)  + P,  In (P,P,) + P3  In (Dzn,,) + P,  (corn,,)  + Ell- 
where rq  is the product of the two countries’ national incomes (the so-called 
gravity variable), PIP,  is the product of the two countries’ per capita incomes, 
DZST is the straight-line distance (in kilometers) between the economic centers 
of gravity of the two countries, COAT is a dummy variable indicating whether 
the two countries are contiguous (taking a value of  1 if they share a common 
border), and e is a randomly distributed error term. As trade is expected to 
increase with size, per capita income, and contiguity, and to decline with dis- 
tance, PI,  P2,  and p,  should be positive, while P3  should be negative. 
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the dependent variable as log (TRADEJ,  where TRADE,, is the value of bilat- 
eral trade (exports plus imports) converted into millions of  US. dollars, and 
estimate the equation by  OLS. The double-log specification permits coeffi- 
cients to be interpreted as elasticities but omits country pairs for which trade 
is zero. This is undesirable insofar as the omitted observations contain infor- 
mation about why low levels of trade are observed. One solution is to express 
the dependent variable in levels and estimate the equation using Tobit, but 
the results are difficult to interpret because the constant elasticity relationship 
is lost. 
Another approach preserves the double-log form but yields results similar 
to Tobit. The dependent variable is expressed as log (1 + TRADE). For large 
values of TRADE, In (1 + TRADE)  In  (TRADE),  preserving the double-log 
relationship, while for small values In  (I + TRADE) = TRADE, approximating 
the semilog Tobit relationship. The equation can be estimated by scaled OLS, 
in which the least-squares  estimates are multiplied by  the reciprocal  of the 
proportion of the observations in which TRADE does not equal zero (Greene 
1993, 697).’ 
In the empirical work that follows, we fit the gravity model to our data using 
each  of  these  specifications  and  estimators.  In  addition,  we  estimate the 
double-log specification in first differences in order to control for unobservable 
determinants of trade that are constant over time. Reassuringly, the alternative 
estimators and specifications yield quite similar results. We therefore focus for 
simplicity on the scaled-OLS estimates. 
We estimate the model using data on interwar and postwar trade flows. In- 
terwar trade data from 1928 and 1938 are available from Hilgert (1942). Data 
for national income in these years, drawn from sources described in the appen- 
dix to Eichengreen and Irwin (1993, are converted to millions of U.S. dollars 
using the exchange rates provided by Hilgert.Io The limited availability of  na- 
tional income data reduces the interwar data set to thirty-four countries, yield- 
ing 561 bilateral trade observations. Our postwar trade data are drawn from 
the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of  Trade Statistics, while national 
income and population data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statis- 
tics. We gathered data for the immediate postwar period in order to concentrate 
on the effects of interwar trade patterns for the postwar development of trade. 
We selected data from 1949, 1954, and 1964; 1949 is just after the first GATT 
negotiating round and a time when postwar trade routes were still being rees- 
tablished, while 1954 and 1964 are, respectively, prior to and after the forma- 
9. If any of the independent variables are correlated with the disturbance term, OLS will produce 
biased estimates. In particular, there is reason to worry that if trade is measured with error, national 
income will be measured with error as well, since trade is a component of income. In Eichengreen 
and Irwin (1995) we estimated the basic specification by both OLS and instrumental variables. 
For the interwar years considered there, the use of instruments made little difference for the results. 
Below we report some instrumental variables estimates implemented in a different fashion. 
10. This appendix  also describes the sources from which interwar population  figures were 
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Table 2.2  Basic Determinants of Bilateral Trade, 1928 and 1938 
I928  1938 
Estimation Method  OLS Logs  OLS Scaled  Tobit  OLS Logs  OLS Scaled  Tobit 
~  ~ 
Mean dependent variable 
Constant 
National incomes 



























































































Source; Eichengreen and Irwin 1995, 11. 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. 
tion of the European Economic Community; these dates are well suited, there- 
fore, for analyzing the effects of regional and global liberalization initiatives. 
The postwar sample consists of thirty-eight countries, yielding 703 bilateral 
observations in each year. In addressing whether interwar trade patterns still 
affect postwar trade patterns, we augment the prewar trade data with additional 
observations  on  bilateral  trade  from  Hilgert  to  match  the  larger  postwar 
sample. 
2.3.2  Results 
To analyze the impact of historical factors, we proceed in steps, starting with 
the standard gravity-model specification, adding lagged trade, and then turning 
to the effects of blocs. 
Basic SpeciJication 
Table 2.2 summarizes the findings from our earlier paper regarding interwar 
trade patterns. This provides a basis for comparison with the present paper's 
results for the postwar period. All of the arguments of  the standard gravity 
model reported in table 2.2 enter with their expected signs and differ signifi- 
cantly from zero at standard confidence levels. In addition, the alternative esti- 
mators deliver very similar results." 
Table 2.3 provides analogous estimates for 1949, 1954, and 1964. Again, the 
11. The coefficient on per capita incomes is somewhat smaller when the model is estimated 
scaled OLS than when plain-vanilla OLS is used. 43  The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows 
alternative  estimators  and  specifications deliver broadly  similar results.12 In 
contrast to table 2.2, for the early postwar period the coefficient on per capita 
incomes  is  not  sensitive  to  the  substitution  of  log  (1 + TRADE) for  log 
(TRADE)  and the use of scaled OLS rather than regular OLS. 
In conjunction with table 2.2, table 2.3 allows us to trace the evolution of 
the coefficients over time. The coefficient on the product of national incomes, 
for example, declines slightly between the  1920s and 1930s but recovers to 
1920s levels after World War 11. An interpretation is that trade restrictions im- 
posed in the 1930s reduced the elasticity of trade with respect to national in- 
come but that this trend was reversed after the war. 
The same basic pattern  is evident for per capita incomes, except that the 
coefficient on this variable is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero 
in 1949.  This coefficient is typically interpreted in terms of intraindustry trade: 
richer  economies  consume  a  wider  variety  of  differentiated  products  than 
poorer  countries,  and  many  of  those  differentiated  varieties  are  produced 
abroad; hence, richer countries should engage in more intraindustry trade than 
their poorer counterparts. The insignificance of this coefficient in 1949 is con- 
sistent with the notion that intraindustry trade was depressed in the aftermath 
of World War I1 by the slow progress of reconstruction in Europe, which pre- 
vented the countries of that continent from exporting the traditional level of 
manufactures to the United States, and by the dollar gap, which prevented Eu- 
rope from importing  much from the United States other than  essential raw 
materials and capital goods. (For details see Eichengreen 1993.) 
The scaled-OLS estimates indicate that the effect of per capita incomes had 
been restored by 1954, suggesting that the prewar pattern of intraindustry trade 
had been successfully reestablished by the midfifties. But estimating the model 
in first differences continues to yield an insignificant coefficient on this vari- 
able  in  1954, suggesting  that  this  restoration  was  delayed  until  somewhat 
later.  l3 
The coefficient on distance is greater in size and significance in 1949 than 
in  other years, perhaps reflecting  the difficulty  of reestablishing  and recon- 
structing transportation networks, especially over long distances, in the after- 
math of  World War 11.  More generally, however, it exhibits little trend. This is 
not to say that there was no decline in transportation costs over time. If there 
is “distance-neutral”  technological progress in the provision of transportation 
services, then the cost of transporting goods over various distances will decline 
proportionately,  and we will observe no change in the magnitude of  the dis- 
tance coefficient. Only if technical progress is “distance saving,” in the sense 
that it reduces the cost of transporting goods over long distances more than the 
cost of transporting them over short ones, would we expect to see the magni- 
12. An exception is the first-difference specification, whose use alters the coefficients on per 
13. We find the same thing when we use Hatanaka’s method to estimate a variant of the gravity 
capita incomes in 1954 and national incomes in 1964. We return to this point below. 
model including lagged trade in quasi-differenced form, as described below. Table 2.3  Basic Determinants of Bilateral Trade, 1949,1954, and 1964 
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0.06  0.87 
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(2.48)  (9.34) 
-0.01  -0.76 
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(13.58)  (0.65) 
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Notes: R2  in the Tobit regression is the squared correlation between the actual and fitted value of the dependent variable. T-statistics are in parentheses. 45  The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows 
Table 2.4  Basic Determinants of Bilateral Trade, Including Lagged Trade 
1949  1954  1964 
Constant 
National incomes 
Per capita national incomes 
Distance 
Contiguity 
Trade in 1954 
Trade in 1949 
Trade in 1938 
Trade in 1928 

































































Notes: Estimated by scaled OLS, where the dependent variable is In  (I + TRADE). T-statistics 
are in parentheses. 
tude of this coefficient decline; there is no evidence of this across our sample 
years. 
Adding Lagged Trade 
Table 2.4 shows the effect of adding lagged trade to this basic specification. 
The first column presents the results for trade in 1949, with lagged dependent 
variables for 1928 and 1938.14 Current incomes and distance still help to pre- 
dict current trade, but the magnitude of their coefficients is reduced. Trade in 
both 1938 and 1928 exerts independent and statistically significant effects on 
trade in 1949 and significantly  raises the share of the variation in the dependent 
variable accounted for by  the model. These estimates suggest that an  extra 
dollar of trade in 1938 and 1928 raised the predicted value of 1949 trade by 50 
cents. The influence of past trade patterns on current trade flows diminishes 
with time: the coefficient on 1938 trade is greater than that on 1928 trade by a 
factor of two. One might have anticipated that 1928 trade would have had a 
14. We adjust the lagged values of trade by the change in the U.S. wholesale price index between 
these years and the year of  interest in the regression, to have comparable nominal values of trade. 
This permits the lagged coefficients to he interpreted more easily. 46  Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin 
stronger impact than  1938 on the direction and volume of postwar trade; that 
component of  1928 trade not  strongly correlated with relative incomes  and 
geographic distance plausibly reflected unobservable economic characteristics 
of countries that encouraged  them to trade disproportionately  with one an- 
other-characteristics  that should have continued to influence the direction of 
trade after World War 11. In contrast, 1938 trade was strongly  shaped by  the 
transitory trade restrictions of the 1930s and, absent strong hysteresis effects, 
should not have continued to exert the stronger role after World War 11.  It is 
striking, therefore, that the value for 1938 continues to exert the stronger effect 
in 1949. This is consistent with our interpretation of the lags as capturing hys- 
teresis effects rather than merely as proxies for unobservable structural charac- 
teristics. 
In this augmented specification, the coefficients on the standard arguments 
of  the  gravity model can  be interpreted as short-run, or impact, effects. To 
derive the implicit long-run elasticities, we divide through by  one minus the 
sum of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables. In the standard re- 
gression, the coefficient on national  incomes is approximately  unity; a dou- 
bling of income implies a doubling of trade. The estimates for  1949 in table 
2.4 suggest that, while the  short-run increase in trade due to a doubling of 
income is on the order of 50 percent, the estimated long-run elasticity of trade 
with respect to income is about one, close to the results from the specification 
that does not include lagged trade. 
The column for trade in 1954 tells a similar story that differs in one im- 
portant particular. The coefficients on national incomes, per capita national 
incomes, and distance are smaller than in the specification that excludes past 
trade but remain statistically significant at standard confidence levels. Those 
on lagged trade (included here for  1949, 1938, and  1928) exhibit the same 
decaying pattern over time as in the regression for 1949. The coefficients on 
the first two lags differ significantly from zero at standard confidence levels, 
but not that for 1928. The sum of the coefficients on lagged trade sum to about 
0.9. By these calculations, the estimated long-run  income and per capita in- 
come effects are significantly higher in the augmented specification than when 
the standard gravity model is estimated. While the short-run impact of an in- 
crease in incomes on trade is estimated to be 0.25, the long-run impact is closer 
to 2.5. These results are consistent with the observation that trade has grown 
more quickly than income over the postwar period. 
In 1964, in contrast, only 1954 trade and not the values for 1949, 1938, and 
1928 has its anticipated positive effect. Perhaps after twenty years the postwar 
recovery  and the GATT process had  sufficiently  changed the orientation  of 
trade that its own footprints dominated those of earlier years.15  Like the results 
obtained for 1954, the coefficient on lagged trade is about 0.94. This implies 
that, while the short-run impact of incomes on trade is only 0.27, the long-run 
15. We analyze this hypothesis explicitly in the next subsection 47  The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows 
impact is 4.5. The large coefficients on lagged trade suggest a high degree of 
persistence in trading patterns and imply that small changes in current trade 
patterns can end up having quite large long-run effects.16 
Here as elsewhere, the interpretation of lagged dependent variables is prob- 
lematic. On the one hand, a large coefficient on lagged trade could indicate 
that a greater propensity to trade in the past actually has the economic effect 
of encouraging greater trade in the present; on the other, the lagged dependent 
variable could simply be picking up the effects of random factors which cause 
some country pairs to trade more than others. Some bilateral trade flows may 
be unusually high, in other words, because of persistent error terms rather than 
hysteresis in trade per se. And the combination of autocorrelated errors and 
lagged dependent variables introduces the possibility of biased coefficient esti- 
mates due to the correlation between the lagged variable and the error term. 
A standard approach to estimation in this case is to instrument lagged trade 
(Liviatan 1963). Since by assumption the instrumental variables are uncorre- 
lated  in  the  probability  limit  with  the  disturbance,  substituting  the  instru- 
mented value of lagged trade will yield consistent estimates (although those 
estimates will not be efficient since the adjustment has not dealt with the auto- 
correlation of the disturbance terms). Obvious instruments are the arguments 
of the gravity model (lagged incomes, lagged incomes per capita). Intuitively, 
including only the predicted,  or systematic, component  of lagged  trade en- 
hances the plausibility of our interpretation that the lagged value is picking up 
hysteresis in trade rather than simply persistent random effects. 
The second column of table 2.5 reports the results employing fitted values 
of lagged trade. (For comparison, the first column shows the same regressions 
estimated by OLS.) Lagged trade continues to have an economically important 
and  statistically  significant  impact on current trade flows in both  1949 and 
1954, although its magnitude is somewhat reduced, as expected. In the equa- 
tion for 1949, the coefficient on lagged trade declines from 0.68 to 0.41 when 
the fitted value is substituted for the actual one. In the equation for 1954, it 
declines from 0.83 to 0.60. In 1964, it declines from a relatively large 0.89 to 
essentially zero. 
Another approach to this question is Hatanaka’s two-step method. This uses 
instrumental variables  to obtain a consistent estimate of  the autocorrelation 
coefficient, adds both the fitted value of lagged trade and the residual from that 
first-stage regression  to the gravity  model,  and  reestimates  the equation  in 
quasi-differenced form. Thus this approach deals both  with the problem of 
obtaining consistent estimates and with  that of autocorrelated  residuals. An 
16. This strong persistence implies that lagged trade is an excellent predictor of current trade in 
the postwar sample. For example, a regression of 1964 trade on a constant and 1954 trade and no 
other explanatory variables yields a coefficient on lagged trade of  1.04 with a standard error of 
0.01 and an R2 of 0.89. Explaining 1954 trade by  1949 trade and a constant yields a coefficient of 
0.96 (with a standard error of 0.02) and an R’  of 0.83. By contrast, explaining postwar trade from 
interwar trade typically yields coefficients of less than 0.9 with less explanatory power. 48  Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin 
Table 2.5  Basic Determinants of Bilateral lkade, Including Fitted Values of 
Lagged lkade 
1954  I964 
Constant 
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Fitted trade in 1949 
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Note: See table 2.4 notes. 
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(3.11)  (2.55) 
0.44  0.29 
(4.14)  (3.92) 
0.37  0.15 
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economic argument for including both the fitted values of lagged trade and the 
residual from the first-stage  equation is that changes in lagged trade due to 
both systematic (observable) and random (unobservable) factors will tend to 
influence current trade patterns, although the magnitude of their effects may 
differ. 
We show the results in the third and sixth columns of table 2.5. These esti- 
mates again reduce the magnitude of  the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable, although it remains statistically significant at standard confidence lev- 
els for both cross-section years.”  They produce a pattern of  coefficients on 
lagged trade that decline over time, as if the heavy hand of interwar commer- 
cial history was gradually lifted over the postwar years. The coefficient on the 
residual from the first-stage regression is consistently less significant and im- 
portant than that on the fitted value of trade, as if movements in trade due to 
systematic factors associated with the gravity model  have a more persistent 
17. Thus,  where estimation by  instrumental variables yielded a zero coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable in 1964, Hatanaka’s method yields a statistically significant coefficient of 0.10. 49  The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows 
impact on future trade patterns than idiosyncratic fluctuations in trade. Only in 
1954 does the coefficient on the first-stage residual differ significantly from 
zero at the 90 percent confidence level. 
The use of  Hatanaka’s method  enhances the importance  of  continuity in 
1954, and it lengthens (through 1954) the postwar period over which our in- 
traindustry-trade proxy (per capita incomes) fails to regain its effect. By reduc- 
ing the magnitude of  the coefficient  on the lagged dependent variable, it no 
longer suggests a long-run elasticity  of trade with respect to income greater 
than unity (or greater than the scaled-OLS estimates). Otherwise, the coeffi- 
cients on the other variables remain essentially unchanged. 
Thus, estimating the extended gravity model using a variety of alternative 
approaches does not fundamentally alter the results. It does not undermine our 
interpretation of  the lagged dependent variable in terms of the economic ef- 
fects of lagged trade flows on current trade patterns, operating through chan- 
nels like those highlighted in recent models of hysteresis in trade. For simplic- 
ity and in the interest of  comparability with other studies, in the remaining 
subsections we concentrate on our scaled-OLS results. 
Trade and Financial Bloc Variables 
Table 2.6 adds dummy variables designed to capture the impact of the two 
principal trade liberalization initiatives of the early postwar period, GATT and 
the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC).  GATT was  initiated  in  1947, 
when twenty-three participating countries agreed to exchange tariff reductions 
and to extend to one another most-favored-nation  (MFN) trading status.’*  The 
EEC was formed in  1958 when six European countries agreed to establish a 
customs union.I9 
Including dummy variables is the standard way  of  assessing the impact of 
such trade arrangements in the gravity-model framework. In our regressions, 
one dummy variable for each arrangement takes a value of  1 when a pair of 
countries both participate in GATT or the EEC. A positive coefficient on this 
variable indicates “trade creation,” or that the two countries trade more with 
each other than would be predicted by their incomes, populations, and geo- 
graphical location and the average behavior of countries in the sample. A sec- 
ond set of dummy variables takes on a value of  I if only one of the two coun- 
tries participates in the trade arrangement in question. This variable captures 
the “external  effect” of  the grouping on trade with nonmembers. A positive 
coefficient indicates greater trade with nonmembers, a negative one “trade di- 
version,” or a reduction in trade with nonmembers. 
Previous assessments of trade blocs and regional arrangements utilizing this 
18. Twenty-nine of the thirty-four members of GATT in  1949 are in our sample; thirty-four of 
forty-one members of  GATT are in our 1954 sample; and thirty of sixty-nine members of  GATT 
are in our 1964 sample. 
19. Each of the founding members of the EEC-Belgium-Luxembourg,  France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands-is  in our sample. 50  Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin 
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Norm: T-statistics are in parentheses. Lagged trade for  1949 is trade in  1938, for  1954 trade in 
1949,  and for 1964 trade in 1954. EEC equals unity when both countries are EEC members, while 
EEC-X equals unity when one of  the two countries is an EEC member. GATT equals unity when 
both countries are GATT members, while GATT-X equals unity when one of  the two countries is 
a GATT member. 
approach have failed to control for past trade patterns and relationships. Insofar 
as countries with a tendency to trade disproportionately with one another for 
historical reasons not otherwise captured by the gravity model also have a ten- 
dency to negotiate preferential trade arrangements to lock in those high levels 
of trade, there may be a tendency to spuriously attribute to the bloc variable 
the effects of historical factors. As already noted, we found in Eichengreen and 
Irwin (1995) that dummy variables for preferential arrangements  often sug- 
gested statistically significant trade-creating effects even before the actual for- 
mation of those blocs. This suggests that controlling for previous trade patterns 
may diminish the estimated impact of trade policies on trade flows. 
There is no evidence in table 2.6 that in 1949, nearly a decade prior to the 
formation  of  the EEC, the  prospective  members  of  that  regional  grouping 
traded more extensively  with one another than  would  be predicted by  their 
economic characteristics (incomes, per capita incomes, distance, and contigu- 
ity) and the typical  behavior of countries in the  sample (as captured by  the 51  The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows 
gravity  The regression in the first column of the table suggests, curi- 
ously, a tendency for prospective EEC members to trade disproportionately 
with countries that were not among the founding six in  1949. This paradox 
evaporates when lagged trade is added to the equation, however. An interpreta- 
tion is that countries like France, Belgium, and the Netherlands traded disporti- 
onately with their current and former overseas dependencies for historical rea- 
sons not readily captured by the standard arguments of the gravity model; in 
the standard specification, this shows up as an EEC effect-as  a tendency for 
prospective  EEC  members  to  trade  disproportionately  with  countries  not 
among the founding six-where  it is properly  attributable to the effects of 
history. 
GATT members appear to have traded significantly more with one another 
than would be predicted by the standard arguments of  the gravity model as 
early as 1949. This is consistent with the fact the initial GATT negotiating 
round in 1947 succeeded in cutting the tariffs of members quite significantly.21 
Strikingly, trade between GATT members and nonmembers does not appear to 
have been discouraged; indeed, there is evidence of a statistically significant 
positive effect, albeit a smaller one than that for trade between pairs of coun- 
tries both of  which belonged to the GATT.22  This could reflect the fact that 
GATT members continued to respect treaties with nonmembers that contained 
MFN clauses and that the Geneva tariff cuts were extended to them. 
In  1954, four years prior to the formation of the EEC, there is again no 
evidence that the future founding members of Europe’s customs union traded 
more heavily with one another than can be accounted for by the standard argu- 
ments of the gravity model and the typical behavior of countries in the sample. 
If anything, the soon-to-be founding members of the EEC tended to trade un- 
usually heavily with countries that did not become members of the EEC in 
1958. Interestingly, this effect is no longer absorbed with the addition of lagged 
trade, either for 1949 (as reported  in the table) or even including  1938 (in 
results we do not report). 
In  1954 GATT no longer appears to have had significant trade-creating or 
trade-diverting effects. This is consistent with the lack of progress toward addi- 
tional multilateral trade liberalization in the 1950s and the failure of GATT to 
attract  new  members.  In  the regression  including  lagged trade  (for  1949), 
GATT members  actually  appear to have traded less with one another than 
would be expected given their other characteristics, although this lower trade 
does not fully erase the positive impact apparent in 1949. 
20. In addition, there is the curious result that EEC members tended to trade more heavily with 
nonmembers. The absence of any tendency for EEC members to trade unusually heavily with one 
another prior to EEC formation cannot be attributed to contiguity because, in results we do not 
report, the exclusion of that variable does not affect the coefficient on the EEC. 
21. For a discussion of the impact of early GA7T activities on trade policies in Europe and 
elsewhere, see Irwin (1995a, 1995b). 
22. This effect fails to disappear when a control for previous trade patterns is introduced. 52  Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin 
The EEC’s impact is evident in the regressions for  1964, when it exerts a 
modestly positive effect on trade with nonmembers. While GATT appears to 
have had positive  trade-creating  effects for trade both  among members  and 
between GATT signatories and the rest of the world, these effects disappear 
when lagged trade is accounted for. This does not mean that GATT was unim- 
portant; insofar as earlier GATT rounds were trade creating, they stimulated 
lagged trade in ways that, according to the last equation in table 2.3, continued 
to encourage trade in  1964. But the two equations for 1964 suggest that any 
positive  effects  arising from the  Dillon Round of  GATT negotiations from 
1960-6 1 were in fact largely the effects of earlier liberalization initiatives. 
Our previous paper suggested that both commercial and monetary arrange- 
ments had impacts on the pattern of trade in the 1930s. To explore this same 
question for the early postwar years, table 2.7 adds dummy variables to capture 
the effects of  the leading regional monetary arrangement of the period,  the 
European Payments Union (EPU). The EPU, created in 1950, was a generaliza- 
tion of previous postwar efforts to establish a framework for multilateral clear- 
ing among European countries; its participants included most of Europe (other 
than Spain), their overseas dependencies, and Turkey. Countries participating 
in the EPU agreed to adopt the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Code of Liberalization committing them to remove con- 
trols and quantitative restrictions on trade with one another according to a pre- 
determined schedule. By providing short-term credits and reestablishing a sys- 
tem of multilateral clearing within Europe, the EPU economized on the need 
for foreign exchange reserves and may have encouraged trade with the rest of 
the world. 
Table 2.7 confirms the importance of the EPU. As in Eichengreen (1993) we 
find that EPU membership  encouraged  trade both  with other EPU partners 
and with the rest of the world. The estimated effects of EPU membership are 
diminished somewhat, however, when lagged trade is included in the specifi- 
cation. The interpretation is that EPU members traded disproportionately with 
one another not just because of their preferential arrangement but also because 
those countries that chose to join the EPU had a disproportionate tendency to 
trade in the past and a special desire to rebuild their commercial relations after 
World War 11.  Once again, our results point to the importance of considering 
past trade as a determinant of current bilateral flows when attempting to assess 
the impact of preferential and regional agreements. 
Former Colonial Relationships 
Most colonial relationships between the European powers and developing 
regions persisted until the mid-twentieth  century. While these relationships are 
known to have had an important impact on trade, it is uncertain how quickly 
the ties that bound a colony to its “mother country” dissolved upon indepen- 
dence. We provide  a partial  assessment of  this question  by  analyzing trade 
relationships among several countries that at one time had colonial relation- 53  The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows 
Table 2.7  Determinants of Bilateral Trade, Including Lagged Trade and 
Commercial and Monetary Initiatives 
~ 



















































































































































































Notes: See table 2.4 notes. Lagged trade for 1949 is trade in 1938, for 1954 trade in 1949, and for 
1964 trade in 1954. 
ships. We first consider trade after World War  I1 among the countries that had 
composed the British Empire and were within the British Commonwealth. Our 
sample of British colonies is more broadly defined than the British Common- 
wealth, which retained within-group trade preferences even after the war, and 
includes such areas as Palestine  (Israel), Ireland (which quit the Common- 
wealth  in  1948), and  British Malay  (Malaysia,  which joined the Common- 
wealth in 1957), as well as Commonwealth members Canada, Australia, India, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. 
Table 2.8 reports the coefficients on the variable denoting pairs of bloc mem- 
bers and that denoting trade between members and  nonmember^.^^ All the sum- 
mary statistics and other coefficients are comparable  to those found on the 
23. The regressions exclude other blocs, such as GATT and the EEC, but our results are robust 
to their inclusion. Table 2.8  Coefficients on Former Colonial Relationships 
Basic  Including 
Specification  Lagged Trade 
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other tables. The result for 1949 obtained from estimating the standard gravity- 
model specification suggests that countries that had once been members of the 
British Empire continued to trade unusually heavily with one another immedi- 
ately after World War 11. As the reader will by now be well aware, this effect 
could reflect either Commonwealth preferences (which were maintained until 
the  United  Kingdom entered the  EEC in the  early  1970s) or the persistent 
influence of past trade on current trade. The second column in table 2.8 points 
to the latter interpretation: former British  colonies traded disproportionately 
more with one another in  1949 not because of the trade-creating effects of 
Commonwealth preferences but because of the effects of history. 
For 1954 and 1964 the standard specification suggests no trade-creating ef- 
fects among the former colonies but some trade diversion. Adding lagged trade 
suggests, strikingly, that members of the British Commonwealth and Britain’s 
former colonies tended to trade less than predicted by the standard arguments 
of the gravity model, both with one another and with the rest of the world, once 
the effects of history are taken into account. This is consistent with historical 
accounts (viz. Schenk 1994) suggesting that Britain failed to reorient its trade 
toward continental Europe and other parts of the world in the  1950s. This is 
also suggestive of an unraveling of the trade and transportation networks that 
had once bound these disparate regions together. Countries of  the empire ap- 
pear to trade less with others than  would have been  anticipated, even when 
accounting for past trade patterns. A possible interpretation is that, as colonial 
networks  dissolved,  the  former  colonies  lost  access  to  the  British  “hub” 
(wherein Britain acted as an entrep6t and reexported colonial goods) that al- 
lowed the colonies to maintain trading ties with countries they might normally 
not trade with. 
The results  for  the  British  Commonwealth  suggest  that  these  countries 
traded unusually heavily with one another in 1949, even when controlling for 
the pattern  of trade in  1938. This effect disappears in  1954 and  1964 once 
lagged trade is included, although the negative effect on trade with nonmem- 
bers is still apparent. 
We also examined trade ties between the United States and the Philippines 
and between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The results suggest that larger- 
than-expected trade flows between these countries are properly  attributed to 
the effects of history, except in 1949. 
2.4  Conclusions and Implications 
Our goal in this paper has been to make a simple point. We have argued that 
both theory and evidence suggest that history plays a role in shaping the direc- 
tion of international trade. The standard gravity-model formulation, which ne- 
glects  the  role  of  historical  factors,  suffers  from  omitted-variables  bias. 
Because there are reasons to anticipate a positive correlation between the pre- 
dominant direction of trade flows in the past and membership in preferential 56  Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin 
arrangements in the present, there may be a tendency to spuriously attribute to 
preferential arrangements the effects of historical factors and to exaggerate the 
influence of the former. 
We have illustrated these points by analyzing the evolution of trade between 
1949 and 1964. We found that lagged trade exercises an important effect even 
after controlling for the arguments of the standard gravity model. While it is 
always appropriate to interpret the coefficients on lagged dependent variables 
with caution, our findings are robust to the use of instrumented values in place 
of actual values of lagged trade to better distinguish persistent effects of trade 
from persistent  random  effects  (where the  gravity  model  conveniently  fur- 
nishes the logical instruments). Among our substantive findings are that the 
omission of historical factors overstates the trade of the countries of continen- 
tal Europe with its former colonies after the late 1940s, that it exaggerates the 
trade-creating effects of  the EPU, and that it overstates the importance of the 
Dillon Round of the early 1960s. 
The implication is that we will never run another gravity equation that ex- 
cludes lagged trade flows. If our paper is successful (and widely read), neither 
will other investigators. 
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Comment  Robert Z. Lawrence 
In this paper, Eichengreen and Irwin argue that traditional gravity models are 
incompletely specified because they fail to take account of the likelihood that 
trade patterns will be  influenced by history, that is, previous trade. In principle, 
this could seriously bias the estimates obtained on the independent variables 
in traditional models if these are correlated with variables that are omitted. 
Eichengreen and Irwin argue that this is in fact the case and present evidence 
that shows how the coefficients on  traditional variables are dramatically altered 
when a lagged dependent variable is introduced into the estimation. On the 
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basis of these results, they promise never again to run gravity models that ex- 
clude historical trade flows, and advise other modelers to do the same. 
I think the paper does succeed in raising  some important questions about 
the use of these models, but I’m not sure where it leaves us. I take away the 
message that it is important to interpret these models with great care, although 
I am not convinced that simply introducing a lagged dependent variable will 
suffice. In my view, there is no substitute for including both current and lagged 
exogenous determinants of trade flows explicitly in the equation. 
An important question is what do the estimated parameters  in the model 
actually mean when estimated together  with the lagged dependent variable? 
Should these coefficients  be viewed  simply as historical  descriptions of  the 
relationship between the variables or can they be thought  of as time-related 
structural parameters? The authors seem to be on both sides of this issue. In 
the introduction to the paper, they note that “the influence of past trade over 
current trade may vary with circumstances”-in  other words this influence is 
not stable or structural-and  this observation  is supported by the results  re- 
ported in table 2.4, which indicate that past trade has variable effects. However, 
in their discussion of  table  2.4 the authors imply that these coefficients are 
structurally stable when they infer effects such as the implied long-run income 
elasticity. I doubt this practice gives us very good answers. It is noteworthy that 
the coefficient on the contemporaneous income variable is virtually unchanged 
between  1954 and  1964 at 0.25 and 0.27 respectively; the implied long-run 
elasticity increases dramatically from 2.6 to 4.5. These results suggest that 
income operates  on trade with extremely  long lags-and  while  most  mac- 
rotrade equations do suggest lagged effects, they do not indicate these are felt 
for more than a year or two. 
The structural interpretation  using a lagged dependent variable  constrains 
the timing of adjustment to all independent variables to be the same. But I find 
this implausible. We know from macrotrade equations, for example, that price 
effects generally operate more slowly than income effects. In this case, the full 
effects of  concluding a free trade area, for example, are likely to take much 
longer than  an  increase in  income. It would  be  interesting  therefore  if  the 
lagged income variables, rather than (or in addition to) the lagged dependent 
variable, were included in the regression. 
Another hint of the problems in providing a structural interpretation comes 
in table 2.6. Suppose you want to use table 2.6 to know what being a member 
of the European Community (EC) does to trade. Is the answer 0.49, the dummy 
on the EC in 1964, or should the coefficient be taken in conjunction with the 
lagged dependent  variable  of  0.77 to obtain estimates that  are six times  as 
large? In this case, the lagged variable is estimated using trade from 1954 when 
countries were not even members of the EC. 
As is the case in time-series analysis, the appearance of lagged dependent 
variables with large coefficients can be rationalized as lagged adjustment, but 
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not simply to drop the lagged dependent variable into the equation but to try 
explicitly to capture the truly exogenous variables that affected lagged trade. 
The issue of exogeneity  may  also be an important problem when dummy 
variables are used to estimate the effects of free trade areas. Free trade areas 
may  well  be  an endogenous  variable-that  is, a response to,  rather than  a 
source of, large trade  flows. Frankel and Wei and others have used  gravity 
models to determine which groups of countries form “natural” trading blocs. 
Presumably, such groups are more likely to form free trade areas, since the 
benefits outweigh the costs. Similarly, it is argued that in Asia, in particular, 
formal agreements are following the market, whereas in Europe it seems more 
likely that these arrangements have tended to lead. If we find a large coefficient 
on a particular free trade area, is that an indication the agreement has strong 
effects or simply that the countries that have formed the agreement have cho- 
sen well? 
Comment  Paul Wonnacott 
As we have come to expect, Eichengreen and Irwin have presented a careful 
and interesting paper on a current topic, adding a historical perspective. Their 
main point, that past trade patterns continue to influence current trade flows, 
is, as they note, “intuitively plausible.” They present empirical evidence sup- 
porting this plausible viewpoint. In the introductory section, they also present 
historical examples, of which I find South African exports to the London gold 
market to be one of the more compelling. Indeed, South Africa is perhaps one 
of the more interesting examples one can think of not only can the gold market 
be cited, but South African exports of  diamonds to the Netherlands likewise 
show the importance of  history  and established commercial relationships in 
determining current trade patterns. 
In any paper with  such a broad scope, there  are always points on which 
additional information could be brought in, or additional hypotheses tested. I 
have no quarrel with the choices of  Eichengreen and Irwin from the options 
open to them; their choices seem reasonable and well motivated. And, to keep 
the paper manageable, they were forced to follow Yogi Berra’s advice: when 
you come to a fork in the road, take it. I would, nevertheless, like to suggest 
some alternative  ideas that might be worth considering. I will pass over the 
issues raised by the general tendency for lagged variables to be relatively pow- 
erful explanatory variables, and concentrate on the more specific issues raised 
by the paper. 
First, and perhaps most important, is what one makes of the persistence of 
historical trade patterns. The emphasis of their paper is on historical accidents, 
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such as empires or wars, that lead to new trade patterns. Once costs are sunk 
in developing new markets, the resulting trade pattern  generally persists, in 
large part because of economies of scale. 
Without questioning the validity of this conclusion, I would like to suggest 
an  additional explanation for the persistence  of  historical patterns of trade. 
Trade is driven not just by the variables in the gravity model and by historical 
accident, but also by the traditional idea of comparative advantage. While com- 
parative advantage can change, it generally does so only slowly. Thus, for ex- 
ample, temperate countries with fertile prairie lands are quite likely to export 
wheat to heavily populated countries with poor soil, and this trading pattern is 
likely to persist. Similarly, one would explain Japanese imports from the Per- 
sian Gulf by the large supplies of oil there, and the thirst of Japanese industry 
for that  oil. Likewise,  bauxite  is  shipped  from  countries  that have bauxite 
mines to those that  have plentiful  supplies of electric  power, most notably 
cheap hydropower, and both the bauxite supplies and the hydropower are likely 
to last for an extended period of time. 
What difference, it might be asked, does this make? Why should we care 
whether persistent trade patterns are the result of historical accidents-such  as 
war or empire-or  whether they are the result of things that might be classified 
under the concept of comparative advantage? It matters quite a bit in terms of 
the main topic of this conference-namely,  regional arrangements. If, prior to 
the establishment of a free trade association, countries are close trading part- 
ners because of fundamental economic forces-those  of classical comparative 
advantage and geographical proximity-then  I would argue that the case for a 
free trade agreement is strengthened. The countries are natural trading part- 
ners, and discrimination against outsiders that any such agreement entails is 
likely to have relatively weak trade-diverting effects. 
In contrast, if the high level of trade is explained on the basis of historical 
accident,  then  discrimination  against  outsiders  is more  questionable.  Sunk 
costs  are  of  course real  costs,  and cutting  across  traditional  lines  of  com- 
merce-such  as between the South African  and London gold markets or the 
South African and Dutch diamond markets-can  inflict real losses. But fortify- 
ing traditional  ties by  discriminating against new outside competitors strikes 
me as less desirable than fortifying the natural advantages that come from geo- 
graphical proximity or from comparative advantage in the traditional sense. 
Second, Eichengreen  and Irwin  struggle with a puzzle, that dummy  var- 
iables  for regional  arrangements  often  show  up  even  before  the  regional 
agreement comes into effect, sometimes long before. Perhaps there is a rela- 
tively straightforward explanation for this advanced effect. Comprehensive re- 
gional arrangements  are often preceded  with  more limited  agreements. For 
example, the Treaty of  Rome was preceded by  the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). In addition, the European Union (EU) was preceded by 
the dollar shortage and the European Payments Union (EPU), which gave pref- 
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also powerful noneconomic objectives at work, both in ECSC and the Treaty 
of Rome. An objective  of ECSC was to integrate so thoroughly the French 
and German coal and steel industries that a fourth Franco-Prussian war would 
become impossible. For the Treaty of Rome, a significant political objective 
was to develop a strong integrated unit that would be able to withstand chal- 
lenges from the east. These political objectives could also have led to greater 
intra-European trade even before the Treaty of Rome. Political objectives were 
of course also the reason for U.S. support for the European Community (EC), 
even though we would be discriminated against. For details on the pre-Rome 
increase in  trade within Western Europe, I defer to Eichengreen,  as he has 
already done extensive research with Bayoumi (1995). 
In North America, there were likewise preliminary steps that increased trade 
prior to the signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and North Amer- 
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Canada-U.S. FTA was preceded by 
more than two decades by the Auto Pact of  1965, which led to a very rapid 
increase in the trade of manufactures between the two countries. 
On the Mexican side, the maquiladora industries had special access to the 
U.S. market prior to beginning of NAFTA negotiations. 
On  the broader issue of “anticipation” of a regional agreement, the three 
cases I have cited-Europe,  United States, Canada, and NAFTA-seem  quite 
different. US.-Canadian free trade was a topic off and on for well over a hun- 
dred years, dating back to the Reciprocity Treaty that preceded the Canadian 
Confederation. A free trade agreement was negotiated in 1911, but rejected at 
the polls. A preliminary secret agreement was reached shortly after the Second 
World War, but Prime Minister King got cold feet and withdrew. From the 
1960s on, there was a major shift in Canadian business opinion, away from 
import protection, and toward assured and open access to the U.S. market as 
a goal. 
The European case seems to me to fall into the middle-laying  aside at- 
tempts by  Napoleon and Hitler to unify the continent with the sword. There 
was a period of about ten years of growing attention before the Treaty of Rome 
was signed. The Mexican period of anticipation was much shorter; the  1990 
approach was the result of a very rapid change in Mexican politics. 
In short, all three comprehensive regional agreements were preceded by lim- 
ited special arrangements. But the degree of anticipation of the comprehensive 
agreements varied sharply among the three cases. 
It is possible that mutual causation was at work, helping to explain the appar- 
ent advanced effect of  regional arrangements. Nations that are increasingly 
trading with one another may gradually begin to consider a free trade associa- 
tion or customs union. This fits into my first point:  insofar as countries are 
naturally growing together, the economic case for a regional arrangement is 
strengthened. The problem here, however, is that the case is muddied by the 
special arrangements made along the way. For example, the preferential Auto 
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1965, and this trade should be discounted in any attempt to quantify whether 
the United States and Canada were becoming natural trading partners. 
Third, let me touch on a potpourri of small points in the Eichengreen-Irwin 
paper. 
It is puzzling that the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) shows up 
as having  substantial trade-creating  effects, since it provides no preferences, 
although it does constructive work in such things as customs clearance proce- 
dures. I find it hard to believe that people have much confidence that an APEC 
free trade association will actually come into effect within the next decade, in 
spite of official pronouncements. Perhaps there are alternative explanations for 
the increase in trade. The APEC area is the center of economic dynamism; 
rapidly growing countries may have a tendency to trade intensively with other 
rapidly growing countries-even  more than one would expect simply on the 
basis of  national product or per capita national product. Is there  a case for 
putting the rate of growth of per capita income as an argument in gravity mod- 
els? Do the  high and rising  income  elasticities  of  trade in table  2.4 of  the 
Eichengreen-Irwin paper suggest that the answer to this question might be yes? 
In dealing with the possible alternative explanations for the postwar persis- 
tence of trade within the Commonwealth and between continental Europe and 
its colonies, perhaps it would be worth considering monetary  arrangements. 
The discriminations involved in, say, the sterling area may  have been as im- 
portant as traditionally defined commercial policies. 
Finally, with the authors, I am puzzled by lack of trend in the distance coef- 
ficient (tables 2.2 and 2.3: -0.78  in 1928 to -0.81  in 1964). One would have 
thought that the decline in transportation costs over time would have caused a 
trend. But two interesting changes did occur in the coefficient-a  substantial 
decline in the absolute size of  the coefficient during the  1930s, and an even 
bigger increase in the 1940s. Was the fall of the absolute size of the distance 
coefficient in the 1930s the combined result of the general strangling of trade, 
together with the rise of importance of preferential trade in the far-flung British 
Empire? Was the increase in absolute size of the coefficient in the  1940s the 
result of  the postwar  financial mess,  and the tendency  to make bilateral  and 
regional financial arrangements in the face of the “dollar shortage”? 
These are some of the questions that arose as I read the Eichengreen-Irwin 
paper. I congratulate them on an interesting and thought-provoking paper. 
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